Monday, November 10, 2008

Court: abortion without husband’s knowledge is ground for divorce

http://www.hindu.com/2008/11/09/stories/2008110960841200.htm

New Delhi: Abortion by a woman without her husband’s knowledge and consent will amount to mental cruelty and a ground for divorce, the Supreme Court has held.

“Mental cruelty is a state of mind. The feeling of deep anguish, disappointment, frustration in one spouse caused by the conduct of the other for a long time may lead to mental cruelty. A sustained course of abusive and humiliating treatment calculated to torture, discommode or render life miserable for the spouse,” said a Bench consisting of Justices C.K. Thakker and D.K. Jain.

Writing the judgment, Justice Thakker said: “The treatment complained of and the resultant danger or apprehension must be very grave, substantial and weighty. Sustained reprehensible conduct, studied neglect, indifference or total departure from the normal standard of conjugal kindness, causing injury to mental health or deriving sadistic pleasure, can also amount to mental cruelty.”

The conduct must be much more than jealousy, selfishness, possessiveness, which caused unhappiness and dissatisfaction and emotional upset but might not be a reason for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty.

Absence of intention
The Bench said: “To establish legal cruelty, it is not necessary that physical violence should be used. Continuous cessation of marital intercourse or total indifference on the part of the husband towards marital obligations would lead to legal cruelty. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted. The absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. Mens rea is not a necessary element in cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill treatment.”

The court said: “Mere coldness or lack of affection cannot amount to cruelty; frequent rudeness of language, petulance of manner, indifference and neglect may reach such a degree that it makes the married life for the other spouse absolutely intolerable.”

In the instant case, Suman Kapur was aggrieved at the decree of divorce granted against her by a trial court and confirmed by the Delhi High Court. Both courts gave a finding that her three abortions without the knowledge and consent of her husband, Sudhir Kapur, was a valid ground for divorce. Disposing of the appeal, the Bench noted that Sudhir Kapur got remarried on March 5, 2007 before the expiry of the period of 90 days for filing appeal before this court and a child was born from the second marriage.

“Since, we are confirming the decree of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty as held by both courts, i.e. the trial court as well as the High Court, no relief can be granted so far as the reversal of decree of the courts below is concerned. At the same time, however, in our opinion, the respondent-husband should not have remarried before the expiry of period stipulated for filing appeal. Ends of justice would be met if we direct the respondent to pay Rs. 5 lakh to the appellant.”

Friday, June 27, 2008

Educational Institutions Cannot Hold Back Certificates : Madras High Court

Educational institutions cannot hold back certificates: court

Mohamed Imranullah S.
Says they cannot be retained for non-remittance of fees

MADURAI: Educational institutions cannot hold back mark sheets, convocation certificates, course completion certificates or transfer certificates of students for non-payment of fees, the Madras High Court has ruled.

Disposing of a writ petition filed before the Madurai Bench, Justice K. Suguna said the academic certificates could not be termed ‘goods’ to enable the educational institutions to withhold them.

She pointed out that the Supreme Court, in R.D. Saxena vs. Balram Prasad Sharma (2000) case, had taken a view that a lien (right to possess property of another person until a debt owned by the latter is discharged) could be exercised only on marketable goods.

The Judge agreed with the arguments advanced by advocate G.R. Swaminathan that academic certificates were not saleable commodities, and hence could not be retained for non-remittance of fees. Counsel had voluntarily assisted the court though he was not representing any of the parties.

The petitioner, R. Pushpa Latha of Kanyakumari, said a private college of teacher education refused to issue academic certificates to her even after completing the Bachelor of Education course.

She alleged that the college demanded more money despite receiving the entire course fee without issuing any receipt during admission.

On the contrary, the college claimed that the petitioner had not paid the fees and owed Rs.35,000. Contesting the claim, petitioner’s counsel A. Dennison said her client would not have been permitted to appear for the examination without paying the fees.

No documents

Pointing out that there were no documents available on both sides to prove their contesting claims, Ms. Justice Suguna said: “I do not like to express any opinion with regard to the payment of fees or non-payment of fees. It is open to the institution to take appropriate steps against the petitioner, if she had not paid the fees, in the manner known to law.”

Ms. Justice Suguna also said that a writ could be issued against private institutions performing a public duty, though they do not fall under the definition of ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution.

She pointed out that the proposition was laid down by a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in 1998.

The Full Bench had said: “Powers of the High Courts (to issue writs) under Article 226 of the Constitution are wider than those of the Court of King’s Bench in England…The words “any person or authority” used in Article 226 do not mean only State or statutory authorities. These cover any person or body performing a public duty.”

Wednesday, June 04, 2008

Court directive to Directorate of Medical Education, KMC

http://www.hindu.com/2008/05/31/stories/2008053160470800.htm

Special Correspondent

CHENNAI: The Madras High Court has directed the Directorate of Medical Education and the Kilpauk Medical College (KMC) to make photostat copies of original certificates, attest their authenticity and hand them over to petitioner-doctors to enable them to apply for super-speciality courses.

For obtaining the photostat copies, the petitioners have to submit a formal letter/application indicating the course and the institution they are going to join for pursuing the super-speciality courses, Justice M. Sathyanarayanan said in his interim order on a batch of writ petitions.

The court said the petitioners applying for super-specialty courses should file an affidavit of undertaking before the court stating that the photostat copies of the certificates were required only for for the super-speciality courses.

A writ petitioner, K.K. Ravishankar of Madurai, sought the quashing of a government order of June last year by which the Directorate of Medical Education had proposed to fill the vacancies of Assistant Surgeons in government hospitals and medical colleges from among non-service post-graduate candidates who had joined the post-graduate courses in 2005. The petitioner said he completed his MD (paediatrics) course at the KMC. For applying for super-speciality course he applied to the college seeking the return of his original documents. But the impugned government order based upon the bond prevented the institution from handing over all the original certificates.

Friday, May 09, 2008

`Creamy layer': court notice to Tamil Nadu

http://www.thehindu.com/2006/09/12/stories/2006091204371300.htm

``Only State yet to identify it''



  • Tamil Nadu has not followed the directions contained in a Supreme Court judgment
  • Benefits of reservation not passed on to really deserving persons

    NEW DELHI: The Supreme Court on Monday issued notice to the Tamil Nadu Government on a public interest litigation petition that sought a direction to implement the Court's directions in the 1992 Mandal judgment, viz. to identify and exclude the "creamy layer" from among the backward class communities in the State.

    A Bench of Justices A.K. Mathur and Altamas Kabir issued the notice after hearing senior counsel K.M. Vijayan. He submitted that Tamil Nadu was the only State, which was yet to identify the "creamy layer" as per the Mandal judgment.

    Binding on Government

    In its petition, Voice (Consumer Care) Council said that as per the Mandal judgment, the Centre, States and Union Territories were directed to constitute a permanent body to entertain, examine and recommend for inclusion and complaints of over/under inclusion in the lists of the other backward classes.

    The advice tendered by such body would be binding on the government.

    The petitioner said Tamil Nadu had not followed the directions contained in the judgment, though many years had passed. The benefits of reservation to the backward classes had been continued to them in education and in appointments to State services, without excluding the "creamy layer" and such benefits of reservation had not been passed on to the really deserved persons belonging to such backward classes.

    The petitioner contended that Tamil Nadu, by not identifying the creamy layer for more than a decade, had literally affected the reservation of the needy lower strata of society.

    "Great injustice"

    The State had done great injustice to the really backward class citizens, as all the affluent classes in such backward class communities were taking away the reservation benefits.

    The petitioner said that if reservation were provided without removing the "creamy layer" it would have a counter effect on the very basis of the Constitutional right.

    The petitioner said that it must be noted that in Tamil Nadu majority of the castes had been included in the backward classes list.

    As a result, the backward classes got a major portion of the seats in professional colleges, as well as in employment.

    It sought a direction to Tamil Nadu to identify and exclude the "creamy layer" and consequently exclude them from the benefit of reservation.

  • Thursday, April 10, 2008

    SC gives nod to 27 per cent quota for OBCs

    In a major boost to reservation, the Supreme Court on Thursday upheld the Constitution amendment law providing for 27 per cent quota for Other Backward Classes in IITs, IIMs and other Central educational institutions, but excluded the creamy layer from the benefit.

    A five-judge Constitution bench cleared the Central Educational Institutions (Reservation in Admission) Act, 2006 providing for the quota, by a unanimous verdict.

    The bench headed by Chief Justice K G Balakrishnan excluded the creamy layer among the OBCs from the quota benefit.

    The court held that the Act does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution.

    The verdict came on a bunch of petitions by anti-quota activists challenging the Act. They vehemently opposed government's move saying caste cannot be the starting point for identifying backward classes.

    The inclusion of creamy layer in the reservation policy was also questioned by the anti-quota petitioners.

    With this judgment, the interim order of March 29, 2007 staying the implementation of the Act has been lifted.

    In effect, the reservation policy can be put in place for the 2008-09 academic session.

    The court held that the Constitution (93rd Amendment) Act, under which the government came out with the law providing 27 per cent quota in Centrally-aided institutions, was not violative of the basic structure of the Constitution.

    All judges favoured periodic revision on the implementation of the 27 per cent quota.

    The court ruled that the delegation of power to the Centre to determine OBCs was valid.

    The parameter applied for identifying the creamy layer among the OBCs for jobs as per the office memorandum of September 8, 1993, will be applicable, the court said.

    It also held as valid the exclusion of minority institutions from the ambit of quota under the Act.

    Besides the Chief Justice, the bench comprised Justices Arijit Pasayat, C K Thakker, R V Raveendran and Dalveer Bhandari.

    Monday, March 17, 2008

    Contract Staff need not be regularised and cannot claim regularisation

    CASE NO.:
    Appeal (civil) 6337 of 2003

    PETITIONER:
    National Fertilizers Ltd. & Ors.

    RESPONDENT:
    Somvir Singh

    DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/05/2006

    BENCH:
    S.B. Sinha & P.P. Naolekar

    JUDGMENT:
    J U D G M E N T

    W I T H
    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 464, 465, 466, 467 of 2004 AND 7575 of 2005


    S.B. SINHA, J :

    The Appellant is a Government Company. It is a public sector
    undertaking. It is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the
    Constitution of India. A policy decision was taken by the Appellant not
    to make any further recruitment in Marketing Division in any category of
    post stating:

    "It has been decided that with immediate effect the
    strength of the Marketing Division be pagged to the
    number of individuals in position in the Marketing
    Division as on 31.03.1998. It has also been decided
    that no further recruitment be made in the Marketing
    Division in any category of post. However, as and
    when if any post is required to be filled up in any
    category due to exigencies of work, the approval of
    D(F)/MD be obtained and the paper routed through
    the Corporate Office Personnel Department."

    Despite such ban the Respondents had been appointed. Before
    such appointment the employment exchange was not intimated about the
    vacancy in terms of the provisions of Employment Exchange
    (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 (for short "the 1959
    Act"). Admittedly, no advertisement was also issued. According to the
    Respondent, he worked at the Shimla Office of the Appellant for a period
    of six months and, thus, he was entitled for recruitment in terms of Rule
    1.5(g) of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules. Rule 1.5(g) of the Rules
    does not envisage regular recruitment but a recruitment on a contractual
    basis. The Respondent, thus, on his own showing was appointed on a
    contractual basis. It is trite that a person who obtained recruitment on
    contractual basis cannot claim regularisation in service. The
    Respondents herein filed applications for their recruitment without any
    vacancy having been notified. They were said to have been interviewed
    on 24.3.1991 by a purported Committee constituted by the General
    Manager. Appointment letters were issued on or about 9.4.1991. An
    advertisement was admittedly issued only on 30.11.1993 for the post of
    Peon-cum-Messenger.

    The Appellant in the year 1994, however, took a decision to fill up
    the posts in the Marketing Division inter alia stating:

    "During the coordination committee meeting held in
    October 1994, at C.O. the recognized union of
    marketing division requested for removal of ban in
    filling up vacant posts in marketing division. It was
    agreed that action to fill up the vacant posts in
    marketing division will be taken by marketing
    division, keeping in view the recruitments within the
    overall manpower strength."

    Actions were initiated to fill up the vacant posts on permanent
    status by following the recruitment procedure. The Respondents were
    also granted an opportunity to file applications thereagainst. Relaxation
    of age to the extent of their services as temporary employees had also
    been granted.

    The Appellant has framed its own Recruitment and Promotion
    Rules. The recruitment of an employee is governed by the said Rules.
    The terms and conditions of services are also governed by the same
    Rules. In terms of Rule 1.5 of the said Rules, recruitment of various
    posts were to be made inter alia from the following sources:

    (a) Employment Exchange as per the provisions of the 1959 Act.
    (b) Zila Saink Boards Director General Resettlement.
    (c) Direct Recruitment by advertisement.

    Rule 1.6.1 provides for method and procedure for recruitment in
    terms whereof all posts in the scale of pay of Rs. 1560-2160 is required to
    be considered as 'corporate level'. Direct recruitment can be resorted to
    only when no suitable candidate for promotion was available in the
    appropriate rank. Rule 1.6.8 provides for the mode and manner in which
    the advertisement is to be issued. Rule 1.6.9 provides for reservation.
    The manner in which Selection Committee has to be constituted has been
    laid down in paragraph 1.11. Such Selection Committee inter alia must
    consist of two members from the discipline for which recruitment is to be
    made apart from an officer from the Personnel Department as Member
    Secretary. In the event, a selection is to be made for reserved category,
    an officer of appropriate status belonging to SC/ST will be included as a
    member. In a case of recruitment to Group C & D posts, a member
    representing minority community will also be associated in the selection
    committee. The matter relating to interview is provided for in paragraph
    12.1. Appointments are to be made in terms of paragraph 1.13.

    The said Rules, therefore, lay down in great details as to how and
    in what manner the selection process was to be initiated, the minimum
    qualification therefor, the constitution of Selection Committee and other
    relevant factors.

    It is not in dispute that the Respondents herein were appointed
    without any advertisements and without any intimation to the
    employment exchange. Appointments are said to be made at the instance
    of two officers. Only after retirement of the said officers, writ petitions
    were filed before several High Courts including Chhattisgarh, Punjab and
    Haryana, Himachala Pradesh, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan.

    The writ petitions involved 52 employees. Different views were
    expressed by different High Courts.

    The writ petitions filed by the Respondents were allowed directing
    the Appellant to regularise the services of the Respondents to pay them
    all monetary benefits in terms of the appointment letters.

    Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
    of the Appellant submitted that the matter relating to regularisation of
    services recruited on ad hoc basis is no longer res integra in view of the
    recent Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Secretary, State of
    Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi and Others [2006 (4) SCALE 197].

    Mr. Ashok Mathur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
    Respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the appointments of the
    Respondents may be irregular but not illegal and in that view of the
    matter, the impugned judgments need not be interfered with.
    The Respondents herein were appointed only on applications made
    by them. Admittedly, no advertisement was issued in a newspaper nor
    the employment exchange was notified as regard existence of vacancies.
    It is now trite law that a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the
    Constitution of India is bound to comply with the constitutional
    requirements as adumbrated in Articles 14 and 16 thereof. When
    Recruitment Rules are made, the employer would be bound to comply
    with the same. Any appointment in violation of such Rules would render
    them as nullities. It is also well-settled that no recruitment should be
    permitted to be made through backdoor.

    It was contended that for Class IV employees, the Employment
    Exchanges were not required to be notified in view of Section 3(1)(d) of
    the 1959 Act. Section 3(1)(d) of the 1959 Act reads as under:

    "3. Act not to apply in relation to certain vacancies
     (1) This Act shall not apply in relation to
    vacancies 
    (a) ***
    (b) ***
    (c) ***
    (d) in any employment to do unskilled office
    work;"

    Such a plea does not appear to have been raised before the High
    Court. The question as regards the nature of duties required to be
    performed by the Respondents having not been raised. No material was
    placed by the employer to show as to whether the job of the Respondents
    was within the purview of the aforementioned provision. The
    Respondents themselves stated that they raised the question of
    applicability of the said provision of the Act in a suit filed at Jagadhri
    when another person was appointed as Peon-cum-Messenger. It,
    therefore, cannot be said that they were not aware of the statutory
    provisions contained in the said suit.

    The order of ban suggests that if any appointment was to be made
    due to exigencies of work, the approval of the Director (Finance) or
    Managing Director was to be obtained and the paper routed in respect
    thereof should be through the corporate office. The Respondents contend
    that as at the point of time the Managing Director, Shri S.S. Jain had been
    placed under suspension, the file was placed before the General Manager
    (Marketing). The said plea cannot be accepted for more than one reason.
    If the regular incumbent or the Managing Director was placed under
    suspension, somebody else must be incharge of the said post.
    Furthermore, the file could be placed before the Director (Finance). The
    General Manager by no stretch of imagination could accord approval for
    appointment.

    Submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
    Respondents to the effect that the ban was only on paper is not a matter
    which would fall for consideration of this Court inasmuch as it is not in
    dispute that the ban was lifted only on 16.12.1994. On what premise, an
    advertisement was issued on 30.11.1993 is not known. It is not the case
    of the Respondent that despite existence of ban some other workman was
    appointed prior to the lifting thereof. Even if, recruitments have been
    made illegally, the Respondents cannot claim any legal right on the basis
    thereof.

    Regularisation, furthermore, is not a mode of appointment. If
    appointment is made without following the Rules, the same being a
    nullity the question of confirmation of an employee upon the expiry of
    the purported period of probation would not arise. The Constitution
    Bench in Umadevi (supra) made a detailed survey of the case laws
    operating in the field.

    The referral order to the Constitution Bench was made by a 3-
    Judge Bench of this Court stating:

    "1. Apart from the conflicting opinions between
    the three Judges' Bench decisions in Ashwani Kumar
    and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in
    1997 (2) SCC 1, State of Haryana and Ors vs., Piara
    Singh and Ors. Reported in 1992 (4) SCC 118 and
    Dharwad Distt. P.W.D. Literate
    Daily Wage Employees Association and Ors. Vs.
    State of Karnataka and Ors. Reported in 1990 (2)
    SCC 396, on the one hand and State of Himachal
    Pradesh vs. Suresh Kumar Verma and Anr., reported
    in AIR 1996 SC 1565, State of Punjab vs.
    Surinder Kumar and Ors. Reported in AIR 1992 SC
    1593, and B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. Vs. State of
    Karnataka and Ors., reported in 1979 (4) SCC 507
    on the other, which has been brought out in one of
    the judgments under appeal of Karnataka High Court
    in State of Karnataka vs. H. Ganesh Rao, decided on
    1.6.2000, reported in 2001 (4) Karnataka Law
    Journal 466, learned Additional Solicitor General
    urged that the scheme for regularization is repugnant
    to Articles 16(4), 309, 320 and 335 of the
    Constitution of India and, therefore, these cases are
    required to be heard by a Bench of Five learned
    Judges (Constitution Bench).

    2. On the other hand, Mr. M.C. Bhandare,
    learned senior counsel, appearing for the employees
    urged that such a scheme for regularization is
    consistent with the provision of Articles 14 and 21 of
    the Constitution.

    3. Mr. V. Lakshmi Narayan, learned counsel,
    appearing in CC Nos.109-498 of 2003, has filed the
    G.O. dated 19.7.2002 and submitted that orders have
    already been implemented.

    4. After having found that there is conflict of
    opinion between three Judges Bench decisions of
    this Court, we are of the view that these cases are
    required to be heard by a Bench of five learned
    Judges.
    5. Let these matters be placed before Hon'ble the
    Chief Justice for appropriate orders."

    The Constitution Bench opined that any appointment made in
    violation of the Recruitment Rules as also in violation of Articles 14 and
    16 of the Constitution would be nullity. The contention raised on behalf
    of the employees that those temporary or ad hoc employees who had
    continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider their cases
    for regularisation was answered, thus:

    "With respect, why should the State be allowed to
    depart from the normal rule and indulge in
    temporary employment in permanent posts? This
    Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State
    making regular and proper recruitments and is bound
    not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent
    transgression of the rules of regular recruitment.
    The direction to make permanent -- the distinction
    between regularization and making permanent, was
    not emphasized here -- can only encourage the
    State, the model employer, to flout its own rules and
    would confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of
    many waiting to compete. With respect, the
    direction made in paragraph 50 of Piara Singh
    (supra) are to some extent inconsistent with the
    conclusion in paragraph 45 therein. With great
    respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions
    clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of
    employment recognized in the earlier part of the
    decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision
    has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or
    casual employees engaged without following the
    regular recruitment procedure should be made
    permanent."

    It was furthermore opined:

    "26. It is not necessary to notice all the decisions of
    this Court on this aspect. By and large what emerges
    is that regular recruitment should be insisted upon,
    only in a contingency an ad hoc appointment can be
    made in a permanent vacancy, but the same should
    soon be followed by a regular
    recruitment and that appointments to non-available
    posts should not be taken note of for regularization.
    The cases directing regularization have mainly
    proceeded on the basis that having permitted the
    employee to work for some period, he should be
    absorbed, without really laying down any law to that
    effect, after discussing the constitutional scheme for
    public employment."

    Taking note of some recent decisions of this Court, it was held that
    the State does not enjoy a power to make appointments in terms of
    Article 162 of the Constitution of India. It further quoted with approval a
    decision of this Court in Union Public Service Commission v. Girish
    Jayanti Lal Vaghela & Others [2006 (2) SCALE 115] in the following
    terms:

    "The appointment to any post under the State can
    only be made after a proper advertisement has been
    made inviting applications from eligible candidates
    and holding of selection by a body of experts or a
    specially constituted committee whose members are
    fair and impartial through a written examination or
    interview or some other rational criteria for judging
    the inter se merit of candidates who have applied in
    response to the advertisement made. A regular
    appointment to a post under the State or Union
    cannot be made without issuing advertisement in the
    prescribed manner which may in some cases include
    inviting applications from the employment exchange
    where eligible candidates get their names registered.
    Any regular appointment made on a post under the
    State or Union without issuing advertisement
    inviting applications from eligible candidates and
    without holding a proper selection where all eligible
    candidates get a fair chance to compete would
    violate the guarantee enshrined under Article 16 of
    the Constitution..."

    It was clearly held:
    "These binding decisions are clear imperatives that
    adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
    is a must in the process of public employment."

    The contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
    Respondents that the appointments were irregular and not illegal, cannot
    be accepted for more than one reason. They were appointed only on the
    basis of their applications. The Recruitment Rules were not followed.
    Even the Selection Committee had not been properly constituted. In view
    of the ban in employment, no recruitment was permissible in law. The
    reservation policy adopted by the Appellant had not been maintained.
    Even cases of minorities had not been given due consideration.

    The Constitution Bench thought of directing regularisation of the
    services only of those employees whose appointments were irregular as
    explained in State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 799],
    Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah & Anr.[(1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N.
    Nagarajan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(1979) 3 SCR 937]
    wherein this Court observed:

    "In B.N. Nagarajan & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka &
    Ors. [(1979) 3 SCR 937], this court clearly held that
    the words "regular" or "regularization" do not
    connote permanence and cannot be construed so as
    to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of
    appointments. They are terms calculated to condone
    any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure
    only such defects as are attributable to methodology
    followed in making the appointments"

    Judged by the standards laid down by this Court in the
    aforementioned decisions, the appointments of the Respondents are
    illegal. They do not, thus, have any legal right to continue in service.

    It is true that the Respondents had been working for a long time. It
    may also be true that they had not been paid wages on a regular scale of
    pay. But, they did not hold any post. They were, therefore, not entitled
    to be paid salary on a regular scale of pay. Furthermore, only because the
    Respondents have worked for some time, the same by itself would not be
    a ground for directing regularisation of their services in view of the
    decision of this Court in Uma Devi (supra).

    In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Constitution
    Bench, in our opinion, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained.
    They are set aside accordingly.

    S/Shri Somvir Singh, Hansraj Benewal, Malkiat Singh, Ranjit
    Singh are said to be working. They may be relieved of their posts. We
    may, however, observe that their cases may be considered for future
    appointment and age bar, if any, in view of the policy decision of the
    Appellant itself may be relaxed to the extent they had worked. The salary
    or any remuneration paid to them, however, may not be recovered. This
    order, however, is being passed in exercise of our jurisdiction under
    Article 142 of the Constitution of India keeping in view the principles
    embodied in Section 70 of the Contract Act. The appeals are allowed. No
    costs.

    Thursday, March 13, 2008

    Amendment in Human Organ Transplantation Act

    The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in CWP No. 813/2004 vide its order dated 06.09.2004 had set up a Committee to examine the provisions of Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994, and the Transplantation of Human Organs Rules, 1995. The report was submitted on 25.05.2005.


    A National Consultation was held on 18.05.2007 and the report was submitted in the second fortnight of August 2007. The recommended changes required amendments in the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994 and the Rules framed there under. These changes are intended to facilitate genuine cases, increase transparency in transplantation procedures and to provide deterrent penalties for violation of the law. In so far as the Act is concerned, the following amendments have been proposed:

    1. To empower Union Territories, specially Government of NCT of Delhi to have their own appropriate authority instead of DGHS and / or Additional DG (Hospitals).

    2. To make the punishments under the Act harsh and cognizable for the illegal transplantation activities to deter the offenders from committing this crime.

    3. To provide for registration of the centres for removal of organs from the cadavers and brain stem dead patients for harvesting of organs instead of registration of centres for transplantations only.

    4. To allow swap operations between the related donor and recipients who do not match themselves but match with other similar donors / recipients.

    Sale / purchase of human organs is already prohibited under Transplantation of Human Organs Act, 1994. Appropriate authorities established under this Act are responsible and empowered to check the illegal activities of human organs trafficking.


    A Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Bill 2007 has been introduced in Lok Sabha on 30.08.2007. The Bill seeks to provide for registration and regulation of clinical establishments in the country. National Council for clinical establishments has been set up to determine the standards for clinical establishments, classify the clinical establishment into different categories, develop minimum standards and their periodic review, compile, maintain and update a national register of clinical establishments, perform any other function determined by the Central Government, from time to time.


    This information was given by the Minister for Health & Family Welfare, Dr. Anbumani Ramadoss in a reply to a question in the Rajya Sabha.

    Source-PIB
    SRM/L